ABSTRACT. It is commonly "assumed," even among well-informed lawyers and economists, that 
In light of this, Germany -hostile territory for liberalism during the Second World War -by the advent of Ordoliberal thought had given more ground in the liberal direction after the Second World War than traditional European liberal bastions such as England (Gerber 1998) . The aim of this article is to furnish a critical examination of Ordoliberal thought on the meaning of competition and anti-competitive conducts and stress the Ordoliberal influences on the actual European competition law. The sections 2 and 3 are dedicated respectively to the role of the state and the meaning of the competition in a social market economy. The section 4 focuses on the constitutionalizing of the competition law. In Section 5 we sum up our findings
Strong State, Free Markets
The main characteristic of Ordoliberalism is its insistence on the fact that markets can fulfil positive functions only if the state establishes a clear institutional framework within which spontaneous market processes take place. In this respect, Ordoliberalism is different from the Hayekian and Austrian School's spontaneity in determining the rules of the system.
3 For Eucken and his colleagues, history, with particular regard to the Weimar Republic, has proven that competition tends to be self-destructive because firms prefer to coagulate in joint power, form cartels or misuse economic power rather than compete. Moreover, the failure of the Weimar Republic shows that firms often achieve such a great degree of economic power that they can affect political power and restrain competition. Therefore, if the state does not take active measures to foster competition, then firms with market power will emerge; they will not only subvert the advantages offered by the market economy, but will also possibly undermine democracy itself, since strong economic power can be transformed into political power.
In particular, market participants have incentives to incrementally transform the decentralized decision making of competitive markets into increasingly centralized variants: each individual agent can improve its welfare if it is able to circumvent competitive pressures or gain protection from competition. Therefore, unlike the laissez-faire idea of the night watchman, in the Ordoliberal paradigm, liberals must take initiative when a government's weakness or lack of judgment leads to capitulation to private business (see Röpke, quoted in Megay 1970:425 public power or, contrariwise, 'too much' private power'" (Amato 1997:109) . However, a strong state does not imply a strong totalitarian state, but a strong guarantor of the free play of market forces. Hence, the competition office would have to be a strong institution to wield sufficient enforcement authority and resources to operate quickly and effectively, in order to attract high-level personnel and protect them from outside political and pecuniary influences (cf Vatiero, 2009B).
Ordoliberals advocated a strong state to establish a set of general rules and rejected discretionary regulations that hamper the proper working of markets.
It was especially important to them that economic policies should not interfere with the smooth function of the price system (cfr. Kerber and Hantig 1999). Ordoliberals asserted, indeed, that such a society could develop only where the market was imbedded in the constitutional framework that is necessary to protect the process of competition from distortion and to minimize governmental intervention in the economy -i.e., public officials derive their actions from an economic constitution, a sort of Kelsenian Grund Norm, without any discretion. Hence, rejecting Marxist central planning -and therefore implicitly the Nazi variant of central planning, corporatism and its tradition of cartels, and interventionism -Ordoliberals advocated a genuine market economy (Vanberg 1998; Kerber and Hartig 1999) .
However, Ordoliberals also rejected the idea of the minimal state; in their opinion a laissez-faire economy would fail to ensure the proper working of markets due to an inherent tendency toward the cartelization and monopolization of markets (Eucken, 1951) . As noted by Eucken (1951:83, italics added), property and freedom do not assure a competitive order:
